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1The Informal Sector: An Equilibrium Model and Some
Empirical Evidence from Brazil
Abstract
We test implications of a simple equilibrium model of informality using a survey of 48,000+ small rms in
Brazil. In the model, agent's ability to manage production dier and informal rms face a higher cost of
capital and limitation on size, although these informal rms avoid tax payments. As a result, informal rms
are managed by less able entrepreneurs, are smaller, and employ a lower capital-labor ratio. The model
predicts that the interaction of an index of observable inputs to entrepreneurial ability and formality is
positively correlated with rm size, which we verify in the data. Using the model, we estimate that informal
rms in our dataset faced at least 1.3 times the cost of capital of formal rms. JEL Codes: H2, H3, K4.
21 Introduction
In this paper, we construct a simple equilibrium model of informality and test the implica-
tions of this model using a survey of 48,000+ small rms in Brazil.
Our model is a variant of Lucas [12] and Rauch [16]. In the model, informality is
dened as tax avoidance. Firms in the informal sector avoid paying taxes but have a limit on
size. Firms use capital and labor, and informal rms face a higher cost of funds. This higher
cost of capital for informal activities has been emphasized by DeSoto [4] who observed that
because the right to assets held by the poor are not typically well documented \these assets
cannot readily be turned into capital...[and] cannot be used as collateral for a loan...".1
Agents dier in their managerial abilities. As in Rauch [16], agents with low managerial
ability become workers and those with highest ability become formal managers, with an
intermediate group running informal rms. Managers with more ability would naturally
run larger rms and employ more capital; for this reason they choose to join the formal
sector, where they do not face size limits and face a lower cost of capital. The lower cost
of capital also leads formal managers to choose a higher capital-labor ratio than informal
entrepreneurs.2
The marginal rm trades o the cost of paying taxes versus the higher cost of capital
and the scale limitations of informal rms. As a result, the marginal rm employs less capital
and labor in the informal sector than it would employ if it joined the formal sector. Thus, as
in Rauch [16], Fortin et al. [6] or Dabla-Norris et al. [2], a size gap develops. Managers that
are slightly more ecient than the manager of the marginal informal rm employ discretely
larger amounts of capital and labor. In this class of models, entrepreneurs that operate in the
informal sector are too inecient to benet from the lower capital costs and scale economies
1DeSoto [4], p.5-6. DeSoto [3] estimates that in June/85, informal rms in Lima (Peru) faced a nominal
interest rate of 22% per-month, while formal rms paid only 4.9% per month. We estimate a much smaller,
but still signicant, dierence in capital costs between informal and formal rms in our sample. Straub [18]
develops a model in which a dual credit system arises in equilibrium.
2Informal rms may also face lower labor costs, because their workers avoid some labor taxes. This would
induce even larger dierences in capital-labor ratios.
3aorded to formal entrepreneurs.3
Although we do not formally test this equilibrium model, several of its implications
are supported by our empirical analysis on Brazilian data. Formalization is positively cor-
related with the size of rms and measures of the quality of the entrepreneurial input. Even
after controlling for our (imperfect) measures of quality of an entrepreneur, formalization
is correlated with a rm's capital-labor ratio or investment per worker. In addition, after
controlling for the quality of the entrepreneur, formalization is correlated with higher prots.
Finally, although our model assumes that all workers receive the same wage, in our data,
after controlling for characteristics of the rm, formalization is correlated with higher wages.
The correlation of formalization with higher wages and prots is an indication that informal
rms produce less value added even after controlling for the entrepreneur's quality, although
it is possible that we are simply missing important aspects of quality.
The model predicts a correlation between manager's ability and size of rm. If we
could measure ability perfectly, formality should give no additional information concerning
size, once we condition on a manager's ability. However, ability is not observable and only
variables imperfectly correlated with a manager's ability, such as his educational achieve-
ment, are observable. We prove that a regression of the size of a rm on observed variables
that are positively correlated with ability and the interaction of this variable and formality
should produce positive coecients. This implication is supported by our empirical results.
We also use the model to estimate the relative capital cost of informal and formal rms.
The model in this paper does not aim at providing a complete explanation for infor-
mality. It overlooks many other reasons for choosing informality such as regulations, labor
taxes, the minimum-wage, or the informality of a rm's clients or suppliers.4 It also ignores
that formal rms have greater access to the legal system and other civic institutions. There
3This implication is supported by the results from a survey of informal Mexican rms conducted by David
Mckenzie and Christopher Woodru that is reported in Fajnzylber et al [5], where 75% of the respondents
reported that they were too small to make it worth their while to become formal.
4Some evidence actually indicates that minimum wages may be as binding (if not more) in the informal
sector than in the formal segment of the economy in Latin America (see Maloney and Mendez [14]). On the
role of value added taxes in creating informality chains see de Paula and Scheinkman [15]
4is also a vast literature on labor informality, which is not addressed in this paper. Finally,
our model ignores partial compliance: rms either pay their taxes in full or not at all. This
matches our data, which only provides binary information on formalization.
Related papers on informality include Loayza [11], Johnson et al. [9] and Friedman et
al. [7], who provide evidence of an association between the size of the underground economy
and higher taxes, more labor market restrictions, and poorer institutions (bureaucracy, cor-
ruption and legal environment). Assun c~ ao and Monteiro [10] and Fajnzylber et al. [5] use an
earlier (1997) version of the survey that we employ in this paper. Both papers explore the
institution of the federal SIMPLES, which simplied and reduced rates for tax compliance
for small rms in Brazil. Although our empirical results speak to a dierent set of questions,
uses data from a dierent year (2003) and a dierent denition for formalization,5 their
results largely agree with ours. They both nd that enactment of SIMPLES increased for-
mality. Fajnzylber et al. shows that formalization is associated with increased use of labor
and capital, and with higher productivity, what agrees with the predictions of our model.
They fail to obtain signicant eects on formalization from access to formal credit markets.6
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we develop
a model of a single industry. Section 3 contains the empirical results obtained using data on
informal rms in Brazil and Section 4 concludes.
5Assunc~ ao and Monteiro [10] and Fajnzylber et al. [5] use municipal licensing as proxy for formalization
instead tax registration, the measure we use. Junqueira and Monteiro recognize that tax registration would be
a more appropriate indication of formalization, but opt for licensing because the question on tax registration
was only asked for those who indicated that their rm had been \legally constituted" - that is, a contract had
been registered with the proper authorities. We do not view this as a problem, since according to Brazilian
law only legally constituted rms are eligible for tax registration.
6In our empirical work we use a broad interpretation of credit - 40% of those who claimed to have
obtained loans (and 25% of the formal entrepreneurs that claimed loans) received their loans from non-bank
sources. In addition, Fajnzylber et al. [5] focuses on rms created around the time of the introduction of the
SIMPLES in 1996, just after the implementation of the Real stabilization program, when Brazilian credit
markets where much less developed than in 2002.
52 A Model of Informality
We consider a continuum of agents parameterized by a scalar   0 that determines an
agent's quality as an entrepreneur, and that is distributed according to a probability density
function g(). All agents are equally productive as workers. Each agent chooses between
becoming a worker, operating a rm in the formal sector or in the informal sector. We
assume that the production functions in the two sectors are identical. If an entrepreneur of
quality  employs l workers and k units of capital, output equals y = kl; with ; > 0
and  +  < 1.
A formal entrepreneur pays an ad valorem tax rate of  and faces a capital cost of
rf > 0 per unit. An informal entrepreneur pays no taxes, but faces a capital cost of ri  rf:
All workers receive the same wage w:
An informal entrepreneur, if detected by the authorities, loses all prot. The prob-
ability of being detected depends monotonically on the size of the rm. Though there are
several possibilities for measuring the size of a rm - output, capital stock or labor force
- we choose here to use the capital stock (which we identify in the empirical work as the
value of installations), because we imagine the probability of detection as a function of the
\visibility" of the rm. We write p(k) for the probability of detection. While a more general
form for the function p can be adopted and our qualitative results are unchanged, we assume
here, for simplicity, that:
p(k) = 0; if k  k (1)
= 1; if k > k; (2)
that is an informal rm cannot employ more than k units of capital, but will not suer any
penalty when k  k:






   wl   rikg; (3)





   wl   rfkg (4)
The capital-labor ratios of formal rms or informal rms that are unconstrained
are proportional to the relative prices between labor and capital and independent of the
entrepreneur's ability. Since ri  rf; unconstrained informal rms have a lower capital-labor
ratio than formal rms. In addition, constrained informal rms have a lower capital-labor
ratio than unconstrained informal rms. Hence the capital-labor ratios of informal rms are
lower than that of the formal rms, the dierence being bigger the larger is the dierence in
capital costs between informal and formal rms (ri   rf). In Section 3 we provide evidence
in favor of the predicted dierence in capital-labor ratios between formal and informal rms.
The usual properties of prot functions guarantee that both i and f are convex
functions of ;w and the respective cost of capital, ri and rf: Furthermore, the capital and
labor choices of each type of entrepreneur are monotone. Using the rst order conditions




















If 1     (
rf
ri ), taxes are too low with respect to the capital cost wedge and every en-
trepreneur prefers to be formal. Since we are interested in the informal sector we assume
from now on that 1    < (
rf
ri ): In this case, every entrepreneur  for which the optimal
choice in the informal sector is unconstrained will prefer to be informal. Let  be the lowest
value of  for which an informal entrepreneur would choose a capital stock  k: For  >  the





for some constant c: Comparison of this last expression with equation (5) above shows that
there exists a unique  such that i() < f() if and only if  > :
7Each agent also has the choice of becoming a worker and receive the market wage
w: Usual arguments in this class of models guarantee the existence of unique occupational
choice cuto points (^  and ). They are implicitly dened by:
f() = i() (8)
maxfi(^ );f(^ )g = w (9)
and optimal choices are:
  ^  =) Worker;
 2 (^ ;] =) Informal entrepreneur;
 > maxf; ^ g =) Formal entrepreneur:
The determination of the cuto points is illustrated in Figure 4. In the graph, we plot
the optimal prot functions for formal and informal entrepreneurs by entrepreneurial ability
and wage (at the equilibrium level). The cuto between workers and informal entrepreneurs
(^ ) occurs where wage equals the informal prot function and the cuto between informal
and formal entrepreneurs () occurs where the two prot functions intersect.
[Figure 1 here]
Since i(0) = 0 and f(0) = 0, ^  > 0; whenever w > 0: However, if  < ^  then
no entrepreneur would choose informality. In any case, the equilibrium in the labor market















where the arguments remind the reader of the dependence of the cutos and labor demand
on the level of wages. The existence of an equilibrium level of wages and cuto points is
straightforward. Workers, formal and informal rms will exist with positive probability as
long as the support of g is large enough. Also, if k is small enough then  < ^ : Furthermore
if  is suciently large, an entrepreneur of quality  would choose the formal sector. Thus,
^  is nite and formal rms always exist (provided the support of g is large enough).
8The comparative statics in the model is complicated by the equilibrium eect on
wages, but is in general quite straightforward. Suppose for instance that the cost of capital
for informal rms ri goes down. If wages do not decrease, the cuto between formal and
informal rms   must go up. If wages decrease and   actually goes down, the demand for
labor by high  rms goes up. The demand by informal rms also goes up. In addition,
some workers would nd it attractive to become informal entrepreneurs, due to the lower
wages and lower cost of capital for informal rms. Hence wages must go up, a contradiction.
Hence a decrease in the cost of capital for informal entrepreneurs would always increase the
cut o  :
An implication of this model, which we explore empirically, is the existence of a
discontinuity in the level of capital and labor employed at levels of productivity around :
This discontinuity follows because an entrepreneur with ability just below  chooses the
informal sector and employs exactly k units of capital, although the marginal product of
capital exceeds his cost of capital. At a level just above ; an entrepreneur chooses the formal
sector and since he is now unconstrained, he would choose a level k >> k: Furthermore, since
we assumed that ri(1   )
1
 < rf and i() = f() we have
i() = lf()
kf()
(1   )   wlf()   rfkf() ( f())
< lf()
kf()
(1   )   wlf()   rikf()(1   )
1=
where the inequality follows because ri(1   )
1
 < rf. This suggests that an informal
entrepreneur would attain higher prots if she were free to employ l = lf() and k =












The left (right) hand side of equation (10) is exactly the labor demand by a formal (informal)
entrepreneur with quality : Hence labor demand also jumps up in the transition to formality.
Thus our model predicts a \gap" in the capital and labor employed by rms near the the
formalization threshold : This discontinuity is illustrated in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 here]
9The empirical analysis of this gap is complicated because we do not observe an en-
trepreneur's ability  and the data set we use has no information on interest rates paid. In
order to account for these limitations we assume that entrepreneurial ability  = xexp()
where  is an unobserved determinant of entrepreneurial skill, independent of x and with zero
expected value and x is some observed variable (or index of) that in
uences entrepreneur-
ship. In our empirical application we take measures of education as proxies for x: In this
case, one can use the expressions for optimal input level choices to obtain the expectation
of the logarithm of employment l conditional on the logx and conditional on being in the
formal or informal sector.
Taking logs on the optimality conditions for labor demand and replacing  with xe,




























uences the demand for labor in three ways. A direct eect exists
since this factor's marginal product is higher under better management. An indirect eect
occurs because a better manager will also install more capital, driving up labor's marginal
productivity. However this indirect eect will not be present for the more skilled informal
managers since these are capital constrained. A third eect, which we call \formalization
eect" and is local to , occurs as entrepreneurs become formal and start paying taxes. This
exerts a negative eect on the demand for labor which is nonetheless outweighed by the
other two eects as we have shown above.
If one estimates a linear regression of lnl on lnx and an interaction between lnx and
formalization (  ) as we do in our empirical section for a sample of entrepreneurs, the
coecient on the interaction term delivers the incremental sensitivity of lnl to lnx due to
formalization. This is the sample counterpart of the best linear predictor of lnl conditional
on lnx and 1xe:lnx in the population. We represent this object as
E
BLP[lnljlnx;1xe:lnx;xe
  ^ ] = 0 + 1 lnx + 21xe:lnx
where the conditioning event xe  ^  re
ects the fact that we use only observations on
10entrepreneurs. In the appendix we prove the following result:
Proposition 1 Let x be a random variable that can only assume a nite number of values
fxign
i=1: If lnxi  0, for i = 1;:::;n, with at least one non-zero element, then 2 > 0.
3 Empirical Application
In this section we explore implications of our theoretical framework using a dataset on infor-
mal rms in Brazil. Tax noncompliance is an important phenomenon in Brazil. Schneider
and Enste [17] estimate that informality represents more than one-quarter of the Brazilian
economy.
3.1 Data
Our principal data source is the ECINF survey (Pesquisa de Economia Informal Urbana) on
informal rms realized by the Brazilian Statistics Bureau (IBGE). We used the 2003 edition
of that survey, collected in October 2003, which contains information on 48,803 entrepreneurs
in urban regions from all states in the Brazilian federation. 7 The survey focused on units
with ve or less employees.8 The sampling strategy uses the demographic census as a frame.
First, preliminary interviews screened households for the presence of at least one entrepreneur
with a business employing ve or less people, for possible inclusion in the survey. The
sampling was done in two stages: in each state (of a total of 27) the primary sampling units
(census tracts) were stratied geographically in three strata (capital, other census tracts in
the capital metropolitan area and remaining census tracts). In a second step, the primary
sampling units were stratied according to levels of income within the geographical stratum.
7When an entrepreneur owns two rms, this corresponds to two observations in our sample. When a rm
has two partners that live in the same household, this also corresponds to two observations.
8The Brazilian small business administration SEBRAE denes small businesses as those with less than
10 workers in commerce or services or less than 20 workers in all other sectors. According to SEBRAE's
Boletim Estat stico de Micros e Pequenas Empresas: Primeiro Semestre de 2005 (http://www.sebrae.com.br),
in 2002 small businesses accounted for 93.6% of the total number of rms, employed 36.2% of the workers
and responded for 10.3% of wages in 2002.
11Census tracts were then randomly selected with a probability proportional to the number of
households in the sector. From each selected census tract a total of 16 households was then
randomly selected for interviews.9. Interviewees were told that the information collected for
the survey was condential and would only be utilized for statistical purposes and, in fact,
a vast majority declared that their rm was informal.
3.2 Description of Variables
We eliminated rms with owners who were less than 15 years old and the observations
lacking education or gender information. Entrepreneurs who claimed that their main client
was a governmental institution, which comprised less than 1% of the original data, were also
discarded. This restricted our sample to around 48,000 observations.
Table 1 summarizes the main variables used in this paper. The rst variable indicates
formalization; it is a dummy variable that equals one if the rm is registered with the
Brazilian tax authorities.10 Outsidehouse is a dummy that equals one when the activity is
performed outside the home. The number of employees (# workers) includes the owner.
Even though the survey focused on rms with ve or less employees, a few units (less than
0.1%) employ more than ve people due to the lag between the screening and interviewing
stages of the survey and the fact that rms may have multiple partners which are also
counted as employees. The variables revenue, otherjob and bankloan are self-explanatory.
Education is a categorical variable with values depicted in Table 2. Age of the owner is
in years and gender equals 1 for male. The variable ho num is a measure of wealth and
is zero for non-homeowners and otherwise displays the number of rooms in the house. The
variables loginv and loginst measure the logarithm of investments and capital installations in
9For more information on the sampling strategies employed, see Almeida and Bianchini [1].
10The tax registry is the Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jur dicas, which replaced the previous system, the
Cadastro Geral de Contribuintes (CGC), used in the 1997 survey. This variable is the most representative
of formalization for our purposes, but we have nonetheless experimented with using \legally constituted
rms" and obtained virtually identical results. This is not surprising, since the correlation between the two
measures of informality is 0.98.
12October/2003 (R$ 1,000).11 Prot equals revenue minus expenses in October/2003 (also in
R$ 1,000). Logwage denotes the logarithm of the total expenditures in salaries (in R$1,000)
divided by the number of employees in the rm.12 The ECINF survey also has its own
aggregate sectoral characterization, displayed in Table 3.
[Tables 1, 2 and 3 here]
Table 4 contains probit estimates for the formalization variable taxreg using two
dierent sets of controls. The signs obtained for each one of the regressors are as expected.
The coecient of the variable \working outside the home" is positive. In agreement with
our model, the coecients are also positive for variables related to the size of the rm
(number of employees), or the quality of the entrepreneurial input (education, age or having
no additional job). Since women in Brazil are likely to have substantial household duties,
the sign on the gender variable is probably related to entrepreneurial input. These variables
may also partially control for other determinants of informality, such as opportunities in the
labor market. The coecients on all these variables are statistically signicant.
[Table 4 here]
Our nal descriptive table assembles estimations that focus on investments, capital
and prots. Since an entrepreneur's true ability is not observable, it makes sense to measure
the eect of formalization after controlling for characteristics of the manager and the rm.
The model predicts that informal rms would choose a lower capital-labor ratio, and Table 5
depicts the eect of formalization on investments and installations per worker. The coecient
has the right sign and is statistically signicant. Formalization has an economic signicance
of 0.43 for investments per worker and 0.76 for installations per worker13. In other words,
11The value of installations refers to owned installations. Rented equipment is not included. Only 7% of
formal rms and 7% of informal rms reported any rented equipment
12For comparison, annual GDP per capita in Brazil in 2003 was R$ 8,694.47.(log(8:69447=12) =
log(0:72454) =  0:13).
13For dummy variables, we dene the economic signicance as the regression coecient divided by the
standard deviation of the dependent variable.
13formalization is associated with an increase in investments (installations) per worker of 0.43
(0.76) standard deviations.
[Table 5 here]
We also examined the correlation of formalization with prots. The results are sum-
marized in the same table. Again, after controlling for characteristics of the manager and
the rm, formalization has a statistically signicantly positive association with prots. For-
malization is associated with an increase in monthly prots of approximately 700 Reais.14
3.3 Regression Regimes
Our model predicts a \gap" in the size distribution of rms as a function of the quality of
the entrepreneur. We now assume that the observable measure of entrepreneurial quality is
x = exp(z0) where z contains education, age, age squared, whether the entrepreneur has
another job and gender. Since these variables have nite support, the index also has nite
support. Taking into account that, given our model for x, we can always choose 1 = 1, we
then estimate the regression
ln(number of workers) = z
0 + 2(taxreg  z
0) + controls + 
which corresponds to the specication in Proposition 1. The controls include sector and
state dummies and we also produce estimates including economic activity outside of the
household, a wealth proxy (homeownership  number of rooms) and the log of the wage.
Table 6 displays estimates using nonlinear least squares. As Table 6 shows z0 is positive.
We thus apply Proposition 1 which implies that 2 positive as is indeed the case. The
results remain if we introduce additional controls (though gender and outsidehouse are now
statistically insignicant).
[Table 6 here]
14This gure is for October 2003, when 1 US dollar was worth 2.87 Reais.
143.4 Cost of Capital
In our model, the marginal product of capital of formal entrepreneurs is:












These quantities should then equal the cost of capital: ~ rf = +rf for formal and ~ ri =
+ri for unconstrained informal entrepreneurs, where  is the common rate of depreciation.




~ rf; and hence an estimate of
~ ri
~ rf is a lower bound for
ri
rf: With the
maintained assumption that  is the same for both formal and informal entrepreneurs, an
estimator for
~ ri
~ rf would be:
yi=ki (for unconstrained informal rm)
(1   )yf=kf (for formal rm)
:
In practice, neither output nor capital are perfectly measured in the survey we used.
Taking revenue (net of taxes) and the value of installations as imperfect measures of output






where y and k stand for the measurement errors in output and capital, which we assumed
are on average zero and uncorrelated with output and capital. Under these assumptions,
the average revenue and installation values converge in large samples to the expected output
and capital in the population. Conventional application of the Central Limit Theorem and































15where 2 denote variances and revenue;installations the covariance between revenues and in-
stallations.  can be estimated consistently by its sample analog which we write as b . We
append the subscript i or f to N;  and r when referring to unconstrained informal or formal
entrepreneurs respectively. The estimator relies on the assumption that the measurement
error is averaged out across many randomly sampled individual and is reminiscent of the
strategy used by Milton Friedman in his classical study of consumption.
Assume now that one samples independently Nf formal entrepreneurs and Ni uncon-
strained informal entrepreneurs and that Ni=Nf converges to a positive value c as the sample
size grows. An additional application of the usual asymptotic arguments shows that the dis-
tribution of the ratio of revenue per installation for unconstrained informal entrepreneurs





avg installationsfor unconstrained informal rms
avg revenue (net of taxes)















which again can be consistently estimated using the sample analogs for its components (for
c use actual Ni=Nf).
Among informal rms, the unconstrained entrepreneurs are those with lower skill
parameter . Since more able entrepreneurs will employ more capital and more labor, we can
use the number of workers as a sorting mechanism and focus on the group of entrepreneurs
employing lower amounts of labor. Using informal employers with two or less workers leads to
a point estimate of
~ ri
~ rf of 1.31 with a standard error of 0.0178. Using informal employers with
only one worker yield similar estimates. Hence we estimate that, in our data set, informal
rms face a rate of interest that is at least 1.3 times the interest rate faced by formal rms.
4 Conclusion
In many developing countries, policies aimed at increasing incentives for formalization are
viewed as an important step in augmenting aggregate productivity. This paper contributes to
16the growing body of evidence backing these policies. Predictions of our model - that informal
rms are smaller, less productive and employ less capital per worker - are supported by data
from Brazil.
Programs of microcredit, directed at facilitating loans to predominantly informal
entrepreneurs, are motivated by the perception that informal rms face an excessive cost of
capital. In fact, using our model we estimate that informal rms in our sample faced at least
1.3 times the cost of capital of formal rms. Closing this gap would no doubt increase the
use of capital by informal rms and augment the income of informal entrepreneurs. However,
another implication of our model (cf. Section 2) is these subsidies are also accompanied by
an increase attraction of informality and associated losses of productivity.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is by induction on the cardinality of supp(x). The notation supp denotes the
support of a given random variable. For a set A, #A is the cardinality of that set. Recall
that we assume that   G() is independent of x and supp() = R.
Step 1: (#supp(x) = 1) In this case, lnx is a constant and we can focus on:
E
BLP[lnljlnx;1xe:lnx;xe
  ^ ] = '0 + '11xe
where '0 = 0 + 1 lnx (so that 0 and 1 are not separately identiable) and '1 = 2 lnx.
We will show that '1 > 0 and this in turn implies that sgn(2) = sgn(lnx). This being a
best linear projection,
'1 =
cov(lnl(xe);1xejxe  ^ )
var(1xejxe  ^ )
) sgn('1) = sgn(cov(lnl(xe
);1xejxe
  ^ ))
where we stress the point that the equilibrium demand for labor l(xe) is a function of x and
. Let  solve
xe
 =  ,  = ln   lnx
17and ^  solve
xe
^  = ^  , ^  = ln ^    lnx
The covariance can then be written as
cov(lnl;1xejxe









)dG(j  ^ ):
Z
^ 









)dG(j  ^ ):
1   G()
1   G(^ )
=
G()   G(^ )









)dG(j  ^ ):
1   G()
1   G(^ )




ln + ln +
1
1      
ln(1   ) +

1      
ln  

1      
lnr  
1   
1      
w:
where  = 0 and r = ri if the entrepreneur is informal and  > 0 and r = rf otherwise.
Remember that
l(;rf;) > l
where l(;rf;) is the optimal labor demand of a formal rm with skill parameter  and l is
the labor demand for an informal rm with skill parameter l constrained to employ at most
k = k. This information is important because
xe




 < (,  < ) ) lnl(xe
) < lnl:
18So the covariance should be
cov(lnl;1xejxe
  ^ ) =
G()   G(^ )









)dG(j  ^ ):
1   G()
1   G(^ )
>
(G()   G(^ ))(1   G())
(1   G(^ ))
2 (lnl(;rf;)   lnl)
 0
Step 2: (#supp(x) = n) Assume that supp(lnx)  R+ and that the assertion in the propo-
sition is valid for #supp(x) = n   1.
Consider the following best linear projections:
lnl = 0 + 1 lnx + 
and
1xe:lnx = 0 + 1 lnx + :
These being best linear projections,
 = lnl   E(lnljxe
  ^ )   1[lnx   E(lnxjxe
  ^ )]
and
 = 1xe:lnx   E(1xe:lnxjxe
  ^ )   1[lnx   E(lnxjxe
  ^ )]
where
1 =
cov(lnl;lnxjxe  ^ )
var(lnxjxe  ^ )
and 1 =
cov(1xe:lnx;lnxjxe  ^ )
var(lnxjxe  ^ )
:
The Frisch-Waugh-Lowell Theorem then allows us to state that
2 =
cov(;jxe  ^ )
var(jxe  ^ )
:
The covariance in the numerator will determine the sign of 2. This can be seen to be:
cov(lnl;1xejxe  ^ ):lnx   1cov(lnl;lnxjxe  ^ ) =
cov(lnl;(1xe   1):lnxjxe  ^ ):
19Let x = maxsupp(x) and K = supp(x)   fxg. We can view x as a mixture of two
distributions: with probability P(x = x) we sample from a distribution that delivers x with
certainty and with complementary probability we sample from the distribution of x condi-
tional on the event fx 2 Kg. The rst one has a support of size one and the second, a
support of size n   1.
An analysis of variance argument yields
cov(lnl;1xe lnxjxe
  ^ ) = Efcov(lnl;1xe lnxj1K;xe
  ^ )jxe
  ^ g +
cov(E(lnlj1K);E(1xe lnxj1K;xe
  ^ )jxe
  ^ )
where 1K = 1 if the sample is taken from K and = 0, otherwise.
When 1K = 1, the conditional covariance cov(lnl;1xe lnxj1K = 1jxe  ^ ) > 0 be-
cause lnx > 0 and #K = n   1. Alternatively, for 1K = 0 the conditional covariance
cov(lnl;1xe lnxj1K = 0;xe  ^ ) = cov(lnl;1xe lnxjxe  ^ ) can be seen to be positive
using an argument akin to the one on Step 1 and the fact that lnx > 0. The expectation of
these conditional covariances is hence positive.
Notice as well that the E(lnlj1K = 0;xe  ^ ) > E(lnlj1K = 1;xe  ^ ) and E(1xe lnxj1K =
0;xe  ^ ) > E(1xe lnxj1K = 1;xe  ^ ) since x > x;8x 2 K and both lnl and 1xe lnx
are increasing in x for every given . Consequently, the covariance of the conditional expec-
tations is positive. By induction, the result holds. 
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22Table 1: Variable Description
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev.
taxreg 1 = Tax Registration 47,920 0.131 0.338
outsidehouse 1 = Outside Household 47,923 0.637 0.481
# workers Number of Employees 47,926 1.477 1.047
revenue Revenue in Oct/2003 (R$ 1,000) 47,188 2.091 6.299
otherjob 1 = Owner has Other Job 48,290 0.125 0.330
education Education Level (Owner) 48,255 4.367 1.884
age Age (Owner) 48,316 41.026 12.312
gender Gender (Owner) 48,314 0.644 0.479
ho num Homeowner  Number of Rooms 48,042 4.889 3.316
loginst Log of Installations (R$) 39,686 5.836 1.762
loginv Log of Investments (R$) 8,095 6.510 2.158
prot Prot in Oct/2003 (R$ 1,000) 44,406 0.775 4.529
logwage Log of Mean Wage (R$ 1,000) 6,485 -1.830 0.855
Table 2: Education
1 = No education
2 = Reads and writes
3 = Some primary education
4 = Graduated primary school
5 = Some secondary education
6 = Graduated secondary school
7 = Some College education
8 = Graduated CollegeTable 3: Economic Sector
Freq. % Description
1 5,106 10.65 Transformation and Mineral Extraction Industry
2 6,916 14.43 Construction
3 14,605 30.47 Retail and Repair Services
4 4,092 8.54 Lodging and Food Services
5 4,427 9.24 Transportation and Communications
6 3,106 6.48 Real Estate and Services
7 2,926 6.11 Education, Health and Social Services
8 4,624 9.67 Other Collective, Social and Personal Services
9 2,114 4.41 Other ActivitiesTable 4: Probit Estimates
Dep. Var. = Coe. Marg. E.
tax reg (Std. Err.)
outside hh 0.209 0.026
(0.024)
# employees 0.492 0.065
(0.010)










homeowner # rooms 0.004 0.004
(0.003)






1. Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
2. Standard errors clustered by census tract.Table 5: Investment, Installations and Prots
Dep. Var. = loginvperworker loginstperworker prot
Coecient Coecient Coecient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
taxreg 0.851 1.195 0.682
(0.057) (0.021) (0.137)
outsidehouse 0.254 0.353 0.187
(0.046) (0.018) (0.053)
otherjob -0.280 -0.271 -0.179y
(0.058) (0.023) (0.100)
education 0.250 0.152 0.179
(0.013) (0.005) (0.016)
age 0.032 0.072 0.029
(0.010) (0.003) (0.008)
age2 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
gender 0.529 0.401 0.264
(0.043) (0.015) (0.044)




N 8,038 39,412 44,087
R2 0.301 0.284 0.038
F (42;) 69.06 296.51 20.91
1. Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
2. The regressions also control for state and sector.
3. Standard errors are clustered by census tract.Table 6: Log of Number of Workers (= Dep. Var.)
Coecient Coecient



















Sector Dummies Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes
Min(z0^ ) 0.013 0.015
N 47,841 6,430
R2 0.4217 0.8597
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%Figure 1: Equilibrium Cuto PointsFigure 2: Discontinuity in Demanded Labor